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We introduce strategy logic, a logic that treats strategies in two-player games as explicit
first-order objects. The explicit treatment of strategies allows us to specify properties of
nonzero-sumgames in a simple andnaturalway.Weshowthat theone-alternation fragment
of strategy logic is strong enough to express the existence of Nash equilibria and secure
equilibria, and subsumes other logics that were introduced to reason about games, such as
ATL, ATL∗, and game logic. We show that strategy logic is decidable, by constructing tree
automata that recognize sets of strategies.While for thegeneral logic, ourdecisionprocedure
is nonelementary, for the simple fragment that is used above we show that the complexity
is polynomial in the size of the game graph and optimal in the size of the formula (ranging
from polynomial to 2EXPTIME depending on the form of the formula).
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In graph games, two players move a token across the edges of a graph in order to form an infinite path. The vertices
are partitioned into player-1 and player-2 nodes, depending on which player chooses the successor node. The objective of
player 1 is to ensure that the resulting infinite path lies inside a given winning set1 of paths. If the game is zero-sum, then
the goal of player 2 is to prevent this. More generally, in a nonzero-sum game, player 2 has her own winning set 2.
Zero-sum graph games have been widely used in the synthesis (or control) of reactive systems [30,32], as well as for
defining and checking the realizability of specifications [2,14], the compatibility of interfaces [12], simulation relations
between transition systems [17,27], and for generating test cases [4], to name just a few of their applications. The study of
nonzero-sum graph games has been more recent, with assume-guarantee synthesis [8] as one of its applications.
The traditional formulation of graph games consists of a two-player graph (the “arena”) and winning conditions 1 and
2 for the two players (in the zero-sum case, 1 = ¬2), and asks for computing the winning setsW1 andW2 of vertices
for the two players (in the zero-sum case, determinacy [26] ensures thatW1 = ¬W2). To permit the unambiguous, concise,
flexible, and structured expression of problems and solutions involving graph games, researchers have introduced logics
that are interpreted over two-player graphs. An example is the temporal logic ATL [1], which replaces the unconstrained
path quantifiers of CTL with constrained path quantifiers: while the CTL formula ∀ asserts that the path property  is
inevitable—i.e., holds on all paths from a given state—the ATL formula 〈〈1〉〉 asserts that is enforcible by player 1—i.e.,
player 1 has a strategy so that holds on all paths that can result from playing that strategy. The logic ATL has proved useful
for expressing proof obligations in system verification, as well as for expressing subroutines of verification algorithms.
However, because of limitations inherent in the definition of ATL, several extensions have been proposed [1], among
them the temporal logic ATL∗, the alternating-time μ-calculus, and a so-called game logic of [1]: these are motivated by
expressing general ω-regular winning conditions, as well as tree properties of computation trees that result from fixing
the strategy of one player (module checking [25]). All of these logics treat strategies implicitly through modalities. This is
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convenient for zero-sum games, but awkward for nonzero-sum games. Indeed, it was not known if Nash equilibria, one of
the most fundamental concepts in game theory, can be expressed in these logics. It would follow from our results that Nash
equilibria can be expressed in ATL∗.
In order to systematically understand the expressiveness of game logics, and to specify nonzero-sum games, we study
in this paper a logic that treats strategies as explicit first-order objects. For example, using explicit strategy quantifiers, the
ATL formula 〈〈1〉〉 becomes (∃x ∈ )(∀y ∈ )(x, y)—i.e., “there exists a player-1 strategy x such that for all player-2
strategiesy, theunique infinitepath that results fromthe twoplayers following the strategiesx andy satisfies theproperty .”
Strategies are a natural primitivewhen talking about games andwinning, and besidesATL and its extensions, Nash equilibria
are naturally expressible in strategy logic.
As an example, we define winning secure equilibria [9] in strategy logic. A winning secure equilibrium is a special kind of
Nash equilibrium, which is important when reasoning about the components of a system, eachwith its own specification. At
such an equilibrium, both players can collaborate to satisfy the combined objective 1 ∧ 2. Moreover, whenever player 2
decides to abandon the collaboration and enforce ¬1, then player 1 has the ability to retaliate and enforce ¬2; that is,
player 1 has a winning strategy for the relativized objective 2 ⇒ 1 (where ⇒ denotes implication). The symmetric
condition holds for player 2; in summary: (∃x ∈ )(∃y ∈ )[(1 ∧ 2)(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ ∈ )(2 ⇒ 1)(x, y′) ∧ (∀x′ ∈
)(1 ⇒ 2)(x′, y)]. Note that the same player-1 strategy x which is involved in producing the outcome 1 ∧ 2 must
be able to win for 2 ⇒ 1; such a condition is difficult to state without explicit quantification over strategies.
Our results are twofold. First, we study the expressive power of strategy logic. We show that the logic is rich enough
to express many interesting properties of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games that we know, including ATL∗, game logic
(and thus module checking), Nash equilibria, and secure equilibria. Indeed, ATL∗ and the equilibria can be expressed in a
simple fragment of strategy logic with nomore than one quantifier alternation (note the ∃∀ alternation in the above formula
for defining winning secure equilibria). We also show that the simple one-alternation fragment can be translated to ATL∗
(the translation in general is double exponential in the size of the formula) and thereby the equilibria can be expressed in
ATL∗.
Second, we analyze the computational complexity of strategy logic. We show that, provided all winning conditions are
specified in linear temporal logic (or byword automata), strategy logic is decidable. The proof goes through automata theory,
using tree automata to specify the computation trees that result from fixing the strategy of one player. The complexity is
nonelementary, with the number of exponentials depending on the quantifier alternation depth of the formula. In the case
of the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic, which suffices to express ATL∗ and equilibria, we obtain much
better bounds: for example, for infinitary path formulas (path formulas that are independent of finite prefixes), there is a
linear translation of a simple one-alternation fragment formula to an ATL∗ formula.
In summary, strategy logic provides a decidable language for talking in a natural and uniform way about all kinds of
properties on game graphs, including zero-sum, as well as nonzero-sum objectives. Of course, for more specific purposes,
such as zero-sum reachability games,more restrictive and less expensive logics, such asATL, aremore appropriate; however,
the consequences of such restrictions, and their relationships, is best studied within a clean, general framework such as the
one provided by strategy logic. In other words, strategy logic may play for reasoning about games the same role that first-
order logic with explicit quantification about time has played for temporal reasoning: the latter has been used to categorize
and compare temporal logics (i.e., logics with implicit time), leading to a notion of completeness and other results in
correspondence theory [16,21].
In this work we consider perfect-information turn-based two-player games and, consequently, only pure strategies (no
probabilistic choice). An extension of thiswork to the setting of partial-information games is an interesting researchdirection
(cf. [20]). Other possible extensions include reasoning about concurrent games and about perfect-information games with
probabilistic transitions, games with multiple players, as well as increasing the expressive power of the logic by allowing
more ways to bound strategies (e.g., comparing strategies).
2. Graph games
A game graph G = ((S, E), (S1, S2)) consists of a directed graph (S, E) with a finite set S of states, a set E of edges, and
a partition (S1, S2) of the state space S. The states in S1 are called player-1 states; the states in S2, player-2 states. For a
state s ∈ S, we write E(s) to denote the set {t | (s, t) ∈ E} of successor states. We assume that every state has at least one
out-going edge; i.e., E(s) is nonempty for all s ∈ S.
2.1. Plays
A game is played by two players: player 1 and player 2, who form an infinite path in the game graph by moving a token
along edges. They start by placing the token on an initial state and then they take moves indefinitely in the following way.
If the token is on a state in S1, then player 1 moves the token along one of the edges going out of the state. If the token is on
a state in S2, then player 2 does likewise. The result is an infinite path π = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 in the game graph; we refer to
such infinite paths as plays. Hence given a game graph G, a play is an infinite sequence 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 of states such that for
all k ≥ 0, we have (sk, sk+1) ∈ E. We write  for the set of all plays.
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2.2. Strategies
A strategy for a player is a recipe that specifies how to extend plays. Formally, a strategy σ for player 1 is a function σ :
S∗ ·S1 → S that given a finite sequence of states, which represents the history of the play so far, andwhich ends in a player-1
state, chooses the next state. A strategy must choose only available successors, i.e., for all w ∈ S∗ and all s ∈ S1, we have
σ(w · s) ∈ E(s). The strategies for player 2 are defined symmetrically. We denote by  and  the sets of all strategies for
player 1 and player 2, respectively. Given a starting state s ∈ S, a strategy σ for player 1, and a strategy τ for player 2, there is
a unique play, denoted as π(s, σ, τ ) = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉, which is defined as follows: s = s0, and for all k ≥ 0, we have (a) if
sk ∈ S1, then σ(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = sk+1, and (b) if sk ∈ S2, then τ(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = sk+1.
3. Strategy logic
Strategy logic is interpreted over labeled game graphs. Let P be a finite set of atomic propositions. A labeled game graph
G = (G, P, L) consists of a game graph G together with a labeling function L: S → 2P that maps every state s to the set L(s)
of atomic propositions that are true at s. We assume that there is a special atomic proposition tt ∈ P such that tt ∈ L(s) for
all s ∈ S.
3.1. Syntax
The formulas of strategy logic consist of the following kinds of subformulas. Path formulas are LTL formulas, which are
interpreted over infinite paths of states. Atomic strategy formulas are path formulas(x, y)with two arguments—a variable
x that denotes a player-1 strategy, and a variable y that denotes a player-2 strategy. From atomic strategy formulas, we
define a first-order logic of quantified strategy formulas. The formulas of strategy logic are the closed strategy formulas (i.e.,
strategy formulas without free strategy variables); they are interpreted over states. We denote path and strategy formulas
by  and 
, respectively. We use the variables x, x1, x2, . . . to range over strategies for player 1, and denote the set of such
variables by X; similarly, the variables y, y1, y2, . . . ∈ Y range over strategies for player 2. Formally, the path and strategy
formulas are defined by the following grammar:
 ::= p | 
 |  ∧  | ¬ | © |  U , where p ∈ P and 
 is closed;

 ::= (x, y) | 
 ∧ 
 | 
 ∨ 
 | Qx.
 | Qy.
, where Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Observe that the closed strategy formulas can be reused in a way similar to atomic propositions in the definition path
formulas  . We formally define the free variables of strategy formulas as follows:
Free((x, y)) = {x, y};
Free(
1 ∧ 
2) = Free(
1) ∪ Free(
2);
Free(
1 ∨ 
2) = Free(
1) ∪ Free(
2);
Free(Qx.
′) = Free(
′) \ {x}, for Q ∈ {∃, ∀};
Free(Qy.
′) = Free(
′) \ {y}, for Q ∈ {∃, ∀}.
A strategy formula
 is closed if Free(
) = ∅.We define additional boolean connectives such as ⇒ , and additional temporal
operators such as and, as usual. Note that in order to use the connective ⇒ we may have to use the duality ¬∃z. is
equivalent to ∀z.¬ . We do not introduce formally the negation operator for strategy formulas, its treatment is standard.
3.2. Semantics
For a set Z ⊆ X∪Y of variables, a strategy assignment AZ assigns to every variable x ∈ Z∩X , a player-1 strategy AZ(x) ∈ ,
and to every variable y ∈ Z ∩ Y , a player-2 strategy AZ(y) ∈ . Given a strategy assignment AZ and player-1 strategy σ ∈ ,
we denote by AZ[x ← σ ] the extension of the assignment AZ to the set Z ∪ {x}, defined as follows: for w ∈ Z ∪ {x}, we
have AZ[x ← σ ](w) = AZ(w) if w = x, and AZ[x ← σ ](x) = σ . The definition of AZ[y ← τ ] for player-2 strategies τ ∈ 
is analogous. A similar notion to keep strategy assignments in the context of semantic evaluation of strategic formulae was
proposed in [34].
The semantics of path formulas  is the usual semantics of LTL. We now describe the satisfaction of a strategy formula

 at a state s ∈ S with respect to a strategy assignment AZ , where Free(
) ⊆ Z:
(s, AZ) | (x, y) iff π(s, AZ(x), AZ(y)) | ;
(s, AZ) | 
1 ∧ 
2 iff (s, AZ) | 
1 and (s, AZ) | 
2;
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(s, AZ) | 
1 ∨ 
2 iff (s, AZ) | 
1 or (s, AZ) | 
2;
(s, AZ) | ∃x.
′ iff ∃σ ∈ . (s, AZ[x ← σ ]) | 
′;
(s, AZ) | ∀x.
′ iff ∀σ ∈ . (s, AZ[x ← σ ]) | 
′;
(s, AZ) | ∃y.
′ iff ∃τ ∈ . (s, AZ[y ← τ ]) | 
′;
(s, AZ) | ∀y.
′ iff ∀τ ∈ . (s, AZ[y ← τ ]) | 
′.
The semantics (or denotation) of a closed strategy formula 
 is the set [
] = {s ∈ S | (s, A∅) | 
} of states.
3.3. Unnested path formulas
Of special interest is the fragment of strategy logic where path formulas do not allow any nesting of temporal operators.
This fragment has a CTL-like flavor, and as we show later, results in a decision procedure with a lower computational
complexity. Formally, the unnested path formulas are restricted as follows:
 ::= p | 
 |  ∧  | ¬ | ©
 | 
 U 
, where p ∈ P and 
 is closed.
The resulting closed strategy formulas are called the unnested-path-formula fragment of strategy logic.
3.4. Examples
Wenowpresent some examples of formulas of strategy logic.Wefirst showhow to express formulas of the logicsATL and
ATL∗ [1] in strategy logic. The alternating-time temporal logic ATL∗ consists of path formulas quantified by the alternating
path operators 〈〈1〉〉 and 〈〈2〉〉, the existential path operator 〈〈1, 2〉〉 (or∃), and the universal path operator 〈〈∅〉〉 (or∀). The logic
ATL is the subclass of ATL∗ where only unnested path formulas are considered. Some examples of ATL and ATL∗ formulas
and the equivalent strategy formulas are as follows: for a proposition p ∈ P,
[〈〈1〉〉(p)] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | p} = [∃x. ∀y. (p)(x, y)];
[〈〈2〉〉(p)] = {s ∈ S | ∃τ. ∀σ. π(s, σ, τ ) | p} = [∃y. ∀x. (p)(x, y)];
[〈〈1, 2〉〉(p)] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | p} = [∃x. ∃y. (p)(x, y)];
[〈〈∅〉〉(p)] = {s ∈ S | ∀σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | p} = [∀x. ∀y. (p)(x, y)].
Consider the strategy formula
 = ∃x. (∃y1. (p)(x, y1) ∧ ∃y2. (q)(x, y2)). This formula is different from the following
two formulas:
– the formula 〈〈1, 2〉〉(p)∧〈〈1, 2〉〉(q) is tooweak, i.e., for all game graphswe have [
] ⊆ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(p)∧〈〈1, 2〉〉(q)]
and there exists a game graph such that the inclusion is strict and
– the formula 〈〈1, 2〉〉((p∧ q)) is too strong, i.e., for all game graphs we have [〈〈1, 2〉〉(p∧q)] ⊆ [
] and there exists
a game graph such that the inclusion is strict.
It was shown in [1] (Section 6.2 of [1]) that the formula 
 cannot be expressed in ATL∗.
Oneof the features of strategy logic is thatwecan restrict thekindsof strategies that interest us. For example, the following
strategy formula describes the states from which player 1 can ensure the goal 
1 while playing against any strategy that
ensures 
2 for player 2:
∃x1. ∀y1. ((∀x2.
2(x2, y1)) ⇒ 
1(x1, y1)).
Themental exercise of “I know that you know that I know that you know…” can be played in strategy logic up to any constant
level. The analogue of the above formula, where the level of knowledge is nested up to level k, can be expressed in strategy
logic. For example, the formula above (“knowledge nesting 1”) is different from the following formula with “knowledge
nesting 2”:
∃x1. ∀y1. ((∀x2.(∀y2.
1(x2, y2)) ⇒ 
2(x2, y1)) ⇒ 
1(x1, y1)).
In Example 1 we show that the formulas with different knowledge nesting identify different parts of game graphs. We do
not know whether the corresponding fixpoint of ‘full knowledge nesting’ can be expressed in strategy logic.
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Fig. 1. A two-player game graph.
Example 1 (Knowledge nesting). Consider the game graph shown in Fig. 1. The states are player-1 states, and© states are
player-2 states. The state s0 is labeled with propositions p1 and p2. The objectives for the players are to reach the proposition
p1 and p2, respectively (i.e., objective for player 1 is p1 and objective for player 2 is p2). With no knowledge nesting
player 1 cannot satisfy her objective at state s2, since player 2 can always choose the edge s1 → s1. But given player 2 plays a
winning strategy forp2, player 1 can satisfyp1 choosing the strategy s2 → s1. Similarly, without knowing that player 1
is playing the strategy s2 → s1, player 2 cannot satisfyp2 at s3. However, with “knowledge nesting 2” player 2 can satisfy
p2 at s3 and with “knowledge nesting 3” player 1 can satisfyp1 at s4.
As another example, we consider the notion of dominating and dominated strategies [29]. Given a path formula 
and a state s ∈ S, a strategy x1 for player 1 dominates another player-1 strategy x2 if for all player-2 strategies y, whenever
π(s, x2, y) |  , thenπ(s, x1, y) |  . The strategy x1 is dominating if it dominates every player-1 strategy x2. The following
strategy formula expresses that x1 is a dominating strategy:
∀x2. ∀y. ((x2, y) ⇒ (x1, y)).
Given a path formula  and a state s ∈ S, a strategy x1 for player 1 is dominated if there is a player-1 strategy x2 such that
(a) for all player-2 strategies y1, if π(s, x1, y1) |  , then π(s, x2, y1) |  , and (b) for some player-2 strategy y2, we have
both π(s, x2, y2) |  and π(s, x1, y2) |  . The following strategy formula expresses that x1 is a dominated strategy:
∃x2. ((∀y1. (x1, y1) ⇒ (x2, y1)) ∧ (∃y2. (x2, y2) ∧ ¬(x1, y2))).
The formulas for dominating and dominated strategies express properties about strategies and are not closed formulas.
4. Simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic
In this sectionwe define a subset of strategy logic. Intuitively, the alternation depth of a formula is the number of changes
between ∃ and∀ quantifiers (a formal definition is given in Section 6). The subsetwe consider here is a subset of the formulas
that allow only one alternation of strategy quantifiers. We refer to this subset as the simple one-alternation fragment. We
show later how several important concepts of nonzero-sum games can be captured in this fragment.
4.1. Syntax
We are interested in strategy formulas that depend on three path formulas:1,2, and3. The strategy formulas in the
simple one-alternation fragment assert that there exist player-1 and player-2 strategies that ensure1 and2, respectively,
and at the same time cooperate to satisfy3. Formally, the simple one-alternation strategy formulas are restricted as follows:

 ::= 
 ∧ 
 | ¬
 | ∃x1. ∃y1. ∀x2. ∀y2. (1(x1, y2) ∧ 2(x2, y1) ∧ 3(x1, y1)),
where x1, x2 ∈ X , and y1, y2 ∈ Y . The resulting closed strategy formulas are called the simple one-alternation fragment of
strategy logic. Obviously, the formulas have a single quantifier alternation. We use the abbreviation (∃1, ∃2, 3) for
simple one-alternation strategy formulas of the form ∃x1.∃y1.∀x2.∀y2. (1(x1, y2) ∧ 2(x2, y1) ∧ 3(x1, y1)). We will
show that ATL∗ as well as important concepts like Nash equilibria and secure equilibria of nonzero-sum games can be
expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment. The simple one-alternation fragment is a proper subclass of the one-
alternation fragment and we will present more efficient model-checking algorithms for this fragment as compared to the
general one-alternation fragment.
4.2. Notation
For a path formula  and a state s we define the set Win1(s, ) = {σ ∈  | ∀τ ∈ . π(s, σ, τ ) | } to denote
the set of player-1 strategies that enforce  against all player-2 strategies. We refer to the strategies in Win1(s, ) as the
winning player-1 strategies for  from s. Analogously, we defineWin2(s, ) = {τ ∈  | ∀σ ∈ . π(s, σ, τ ) | } as the
set of winning player-2 strategies for  from s. Using the notationWin1 andWin2, the semantics of simple one-alternation
strategy formulas can be written as follows: if 
 = (∃1, ∃2, 3), then [
] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Win1(s, 1). ∃τ ∈
Win2(s, 2). π(s, σ, τ ) | 3}. Thus the intuitive interpretation of the formula 
 = (∃1, ∃2, 3) is as follows: there
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is a player-1 winning strategy σ for1 and there is a player-2 winning strategy τ for2 such that the path formed by fixing
the strategies σ and τ satisfies 3.
5. Expressive power of strategy logic
In this section we show that ATL∗ and several concepts in nonzero-sum games can be expressed in the simple
one-alternation fragment of strategy logic. We also show that game logic, which was introduced in [1] to express the
module-checking problem [25], can be expressed in the one-alternation fragment of strategy logic (but not in the sim-
ple one-alternation fragment).
5.1. Expressing ATL∗ and ATL
For every path formula  , we have
[〈〈1〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∃x. ∀y. (x, y)] = [(∃, ∃tt, tt)];
[〈〈1, 2〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∃x. ∃y. (x, y)] = [(∃tt, ∃tt, )].
The formulas [〈〈2〉〉()] and [〈〈∅〉〉()] can be expressed similarly. Hence the logic ATL∗ can be defined in the simple one-
alternation fragment of strategy logic, and ATL can be defined in the simple one-alternation fragment with unnested path
formulas. Observe thatATL∗ formulas are expressed as closed formulas, and hence nesting of 〈〈·〉〉 operators of ATL∗ formulas
does not increase the alternation depth when expressed as formulas in the strategy logic. Hence ATL∗ can be expressed in
the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic.
5.2. Expressing Nash equilibria
In nonzero-sum games the input is a labeled game graph and two path formulas, which express the objectives of the
two players. We define Nash equilibria [18] and show that their existence can be expressed in the simple one-alternation
fragment of strategy logic.
Payoff profiles. Given a labeled game graph (G, P, L), two path formulas 1 and 2, strategies σ and τ for the two players,
and a state s ∈ S, the payoff for player , where  ∈ {1, 2}, is defined as follows:
p(s, σ, τ, ) =
{
1 if π(s, σ, τ ) | ;
0 otherwise.
The payoff profile (p1, p2) consists of the payoffs p1 = p1(s, σ, τ, 1) and p2 = p2(s, σ, τ, 2) for player 1 and player 2.
Nash equilibria. A strategy profile (σ, τ ) consists of strategies σ ∈  and τ ∈  for the two players. Given a labeled game
graph (G, P, L) and two path formulas 1 and 2, the strategy profile (σ
∗, τ ∗) is a Nash equilibrium at a state s ∈ S if the
following two conditions hold:
(1) ∀σ ∈ . p1(s, σ, τ ∗, 1) ≤ p1(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 1);
(2) ∀τ ∈ . p2(s, σ ∗, τ, 2) ≤ p2(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 2).
The state sets of the corresponding payoff profiles are defined as follows: for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
NE(i, j) = {s ∈ S | there exists a Nash equilibrium (σ ∗, τ ∗) at s such that
p1(s, σ
∗, τ ∗, 1) = i and p2(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 2) = j}.
Existence of Nash equilibria.We now define the state sets of the payoff profiles for Nash equilibria by simple one-alternation
strategy formulas. The formulas are as follows:
NE(1, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃tt, 1 ∧ 2)];
NE(0, 0) = [(∃¬2, ∃¬1, tt)];
NE(1, 0) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. (∃τ. π(s, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ ∀τ ′. π(s, σ, τ ′) | ¬2)} = [(∃¬2, ∃tt, 1)];
NE(0, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃¬1, 2)].
K. Chatterjee et al. / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 677–693 683
Intuitively, every pair of strategies σ and τ , such thatπ(s, σ, τ ) | 1∧2 is aNE(1, 1) because it achieves themaximal
payoff for each player, and hence neither player has an incentive to deviate. Conversely, if a strategy pair σ and τ ensures
a NE(1, 1), then π(s, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2. For a Nash equilibrium strategy pair (σ, τ ), if the payoff for player 1 is 0, then it
means that for all strategies σ ′ we haveπ(s, σ ′, τ ) | 1, i.e., the strategy τ ensures¬1 (or in other words, the strategy τ
is winning for¬1). Similar reasoning holds when the payoff for player 2 is 0 for a Nash equilibrium. Every pair of strategies
σ and τ , such that σ ensures¬2 and τ ensures¬1 is in NE(0, 0) because for every strategy σ ′ player 1’s payoff is going
to remain 0, and analogously for player 2. Conversely, if σ and τ is Nash equilibrium strategy such that the payoff profile
is (0, 0), then σ ensures¬1 and τ ensures¬2. Finally, if σ ensures¬2 and π(s, σ, τ ) | 1, then we have a NE(1, 0).
Indeed, player 1’s payoff can only decrease and player 2’s payoff remains 0 regardless of the chosen strategy. Thus we obtain
the above characterization of Nash equilibrium payoff profile by strategy logic formulas.
5.3. Expressing secure equilibria
A notion of conditional competitiveness in nonzero-sum games was formalized by introducing secure equilibria [9]. The
notion of secure has been shown to be relevant in the context of verification and assume-guarantee synthesis [8]. We show
that the existence of secure equilibria can be expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic.
Lexicographic ordering of payoff profiles.We define two lexicographic orderings1 and2 on payoff profiles. For two payoff
profiles (p1, p2) and (p
′
1, p
′
2), we have
(p1, p2) 1 (p′1, p′2) iff (p1 < p′1) ∨ (p1 = p′1 ∧ p2 ≥ p′2);
(p1, p2) 2 (p′1, p′2) iff (p2 < p′2) ∨ (p2 = p′2 ∧ p1 ≥ p′1).
Secure equilibria. A secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with respect to the lexicographic preference orderings 1 and2 on payoff profiles for the two players. Formally, given a labeled game graph (G, P, L) and two path formulas1 and2,
a strategy profile (σ ∗, τ ∗) is a secure equilibrium at a state s ∈ S if the following two conditions hold:
∀σ ∈ . (p1(s, σ, τ ∗, 1), p2(s, σ, τ ∗, 2)) 1 (p1(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 1), p2(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 2));
∀τ ∈ . (p1(s, σ ∗, τ, 1), p2(s, σ ∗, τ, 2)) 2 (p1(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 1), p2(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 2)).
The state sets of the corresponding payoff profiles are defined as follows: for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
SE(i, j) = {s ∈ S | there exists a secure equilibrium (σ ∗, τ ∗) at s such that
p1(s, σ
∗, τ ∗, 1) = i and p2(s, σ ∗, τ ∗, 2) = j}.
It follows from the definitions that the sets SE(i, j), for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, can be expressed in the one-alternation fragment (in the
∃∀ fragment). The state sets of maximal payoff profiles for secure equilibria are defined as follows: for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
MS(i, j) = {s ∈ SE(i, j) | if s ∈ SE(i′, j′), then (i′, j′) 1 (i, j) ∧ (i′, j′) 2 (i, j)}.
The following alternative characterizations of these sets are established in [9]:
MS(1, 0) = {s ∈ S | Win1(s, 1 ∧ ¬2) = ∅};
MS(0, 1) = {s ∈ S | Win2(s, 2 ∧ ¬1) = ∅};
MS(1, 1) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Win1(s, 2 ⇒ 1). ∃τ ∈ Win2(s, 1 ⇒ 2). π(s, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2};
MS(0, 0) = S \ (MS(1, 0) ∪ MS(0, 1) ∪ MS(1, 1)).
Existence of secure equilibria. From the alternative characterizations of the state sets of themaximal payoff profiles for secure
equilibria, it follows that these sets can be defined by simple one-alternation strategy formulas. The formulas are as follows:
MS(1, 0) = [(∃(1 ∧ ¬2), ∃tt, tt)];
MS(0, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃(2 ∧ ¬1), tt)];
MS(1, 1) = [(∃(2 ⇒ 1), ∃(1 ⇒ 2), 1 ∧ 2)].
684 K. Chatterjee et al. / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 677–693
The set MS(0, 0) can be obtained by complementing the disjunction of the three formulas for MS(1, 0), MS(0, 1), and
MS(1, 1). Observe that in the simple one-alternation fragment we have conjunction and negation as the boolean operators,
and hence disjunction can be easily expressed.
5.4. Game logic and module checking
The syntax of game logic [1] is as follows. State formulas have the form ∃∃{1}. θ or ∃∃{2}. θ , where θ is a tree formula.
Tree formulas are (a) state formulas, (b) boolean combinations of tree formulas, and (c) either ∃ or ∀ , where is a path
formula. Informally, the formula ∃∃{1}. θ is true at a state if there is a strategy σ for player 1 such that the tree formula θ
is satisfied in the tree that is generated by fixing the strategy σ for player 1 (see [1] for details). Game logic can be defined
in the one-alternation fragment of strategy logic (but not in the simple one-alternation fragment). The following example
illustrates how to translate a state formula of game logic into a one-alternation strategy formula:
[∃∃{1}.(∃1 ∧ ∀2 ∨ ∀3)] = [∃x. (∃y1. 1(x, y1) ∧ ∀y2. 2(x, y2) ∨ ∀y3. 3(x, y3)].
Consequently, the module-checking problem [25] can be expressed by one-alternation strategy formulas.
The following theorem compares the expressive power of strategy logic and its fragments with ATL∗, game logic, the
alternating-time μ-calculus [1,22], and monadic second-order logic [31,33]. We remark that strategy logic formulas are
interpreted over two-player turn-based game structures, and the following theorem compares the expressive powers of
different logics when interpreted over two-player turn-based game structures. The logics ATL∗, game logic, and alternating-
time μ-calculus in general can be interpreted over multi-player game structures, however, since in this work we consider
two-player game structures we consider the two-player version of ATL∗, game logic and alternating-time μ-calculus.
Theorem 1. (Expressiveness). The following assertions hold.
(i) On two-player game structures the expressiveness of the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic coincides with
ATL∗, and the one-alternation fragment of strategy logic is more expressive than ATL∗.
(ii) On two-player game structures the one-alternation fragment of strategy logic is more expressive than game logic, and game
logic is more expressive than the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic.
(iii) The alternating-timeμ-calculus is not as expressive as the alternation-free fragment of strategy logic, and strategy logic is
not as expressive as the alternating-time μ-calculus.
(iv) Monadic second-order (MSO) logic is more expressive than strategy logic.
Proof.We prove all the cases below.
(i) We first show that ATL∗ can be expressed in simple one-alternation fragment. For a path formula  we have
[〈〈1〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ.∀τ.π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∃x.∀y.(x, y)] = [(∃, ∃tt, tt)];
[〈〈2〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∃τ.∀σ.π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∃y.∀x.(x, y)] = [(∃tt, ∃, tt)];
[〈〈1, 2〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ.∃τ.π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∃x.∃y.(x, y)] = [(∃tt, ∃tt, )];
[〈〈∅〉〉()] = {s ∈ S | ∀σ.∀τ.π(s, σ, τ ) | } = [∀x.∀y.(x, y)] = [¬(∃tt, ∃tt,¬)].
Since the simpleone-alternation fragment allows closed formulas tobe treated inaway similar to atomicpropositions,
it follows that the logicATL∗ can be expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic, andATL can be
expressed in the simpleone-alternation fragmentwithunnestedpath formulas. It follows fromTheorem5(part 1) (see
the paragraph following Theorem 5) that the expressiveness of ATL∗ and simple one-alternation fragment coincide.
Since game logic is more expressive than ATL∗ [1] and game logic can be expressed in the one-alternation fragment
it follows that one-alternation fragment is more expressive than ATL∗.
(ii) The game logic can be expressed in ∃∀ fragment of the strategy logic. The translation a state formula of game logic
into a closed one-alternation strategy formula is as follows:
[∃∃{1}.(∃1 ∧ ∀2 ∨ ∀3)] = [∃x. (∃y1. 1(x, y1) ∧ ∀y2. 2(x, y2) ∨ ∀y3. 3(x, y3)].
The translation of any formula of game logic to a closed one-alternation strategy logic formula follows by induction.
Game logic is not as expressive as one-alternation fragment: for example, in one-alternation fragment of strategy logic
starting with a existential quantification over several strategy variables (such as ∃x1.∃x2.∃y1.∃y2.) several strategy
trees are created that can be analyzed simultaneously by the inner formula, and such multiple instantiations of trees
simultaneously is not allowed in game logic. By part (1) it follows that the expressive power of simple one-alternation
fragment coincides with ATL∗, and the result of [1] shows that game logic is more expressive that ATL∗. It follows
that game logic is more expressive than the simple one-alternation fragment.
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(iii) It follows from the results of [1] that the following formula
∃x. (∃y1. (p)(x, y1) ∧ ∃y2. (q)(x, y2)),
cannot be expressed in alternating μ-calculus. The above formula is an alternation free strategy logic formula. We
nowpresent alternatingμ-calculus formulas that are not expressible in strategy logic. Consider one-player structures
(i.e., S2 = ∅). The following formula
νx. [p ∧ AX(AX(x))],
specifies the setof states s such that inall paths from severyevenposition is labeledby thepropositionp. Suchcounting
properties cannot be expressed in strategy logic. Also consider the following formula over one-player structures:
μx.(q ∨ (p ∧ EX(x)) ∨ (¬p ∧ AX(x))).
The formula says that the proposition p turns the one-player game into a two-player game: states with proposition p
acts as player 1 states (i.e., [p] = S1) and states with proposition ¬p acts as player 2 states (i.e., [¬p] = S2), and the
formula specifies that there is a p player strategy to reach q against all¬p player strategy. Thus alternatingμ-calculus
can transform a one-player structure to a two-player game structure. Strategy logic formulas on one-player structure
can only quantify over strategies of one player and cannot convert it to a two-player game structure. Hence the above
property is not expressible by strategy logic on one-player structures.
(iv) We now argue that MSO is more expressive than strategy logic: encoding strategies as trees, a strategy logic formula
can be translated to an MSO formula. Hence MSO is as expressive as strategy logic. Since MSO contains alternating
μ-calculus and strategy logic is not as expressive as alternating μ-calculus, it follows that MSO is more expressive
than strategy logic. 
6. Model checking strategy logic
In this section we solve the model-checking problem for strategy logic. We encode strategies by using strategy trees.
We reason about strategy trees using tree automata, making our solution similar to Rabin’s usage of tree automata for solv-
ing the satisfiability problem of monadic second-order logic [31]. We give the necessary definitions and proceed with the
algorithm.
6.1. Strategy trees and tree automata
Given a finite set ϒ of directions, an ϒ-tree is a set T ⊆ ϒ∗ such that if x · υ ∈ T , where υ ∈ ϒ and x ∈ ϒ∗, then also
x ∈ T . The elements of T are called nodes, and the empty word ε is the root of T . For every υ ∈ ϒ and x ∈ T , the node x
is the parent of x · υ . Each node x = ε of T has a direction in ϒ . The direction of the root is the symbol ⊥ (we assume that
⊥ ∈ ϒ). The direction of a node x · υ is υ . We denote by dir(x) the direction of node x. An ϒ-tree T is a full infinite tree if
T = ϒ∗. A path π of a tree T is a set π ⊆ T such that ε ∈ π , and for every x ∈ π there exists a unique υ ∈ ϒ such that
x · υ ∈ π .
Given two finite sets ϒ and , a -labeled ϒ-tree is a pair 〈T, ρ〉, where T is an ϒ-tree, and ρ: T →  maps each node
of T to a letter in . When ϒ and  are not important or clear from the context, we call 〈T, ρ〉 a labeled tree. We say that
an ((ϒ ∪ {⊥}) × )-labeled ϒ-tree 〈T, ρ〉 is ϒ-exhaustive if for every node z ∈ T , we have ρ(z) ∈ {dir(z)} × .
Consider a game graph G = ((S, E), (S1, S2)). For α ∈ {1, 2}, a strategy σ : S∗ · Sα → S can be encoded by an S-labeled
S-tree 〈S∗, ρ〉 by setting σ(v) = ρ(v) for every v ∈ S∗ · Sα . Notice that σ may be encoded by many different trees. Indeed,
for a node v = s0 · · · sn such that either sn ∈ S3−α or there exists some i such that (si, si+1) /∈ E, the label ρ(v) may be set
arbitrarily. We may encode k different strategies by considering an Sk-labeled S-tree. Given a letter λ ∈ Sk , we denote by λi
the projection of λ on its i-th coordinate. In this case, the i-th strategy is σi(v) = ρ(v)i for every v ∈ S∗ · Sα . Notice that the
different encoded strategies may belong to different players. We refer to such trees as strategy trees, and from now on, we
may refer to a strategy as a tree 〈S∗, σ 〉. In what follows we encode strategies by strategy trees. We construct tree automata
that accept the strategy assignments that satisfy a given formula of strategy logic.
We use tree automata to reason about strategy trees. As we only use well-known results about such automata, we do not
give a full formal definition, and refer the reader to [33]. Here, we use alternating parity tree automata (APTs). The language
of an automaton is the set of labeled trees that it accepts. The size of an automaton is measured by the number of states, and
the index, which is a measure of the complexity of the acceptance (parity) condition. The important qualities of automata
that are needed for this paper are summarized in Theorem 2 below.
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Theorem 2.
(i) Given an LTL formula  , we can construct an APT A with 2O(||) states and index 3 such that A accepts all labeled
trees all of whose paths satisfy  [35].
(ii) Given two APTs A1 and A2 with n1 and n2 states and indices k1 and k2, respectively, we can construct APTs for the
conjunction and disjunction of the languages of A1 and A2 with n1 + n2 states and index max(k1, k2). We can also
construct an APT for the complementary language of A1 with n1 states and index k1 [28].
(iii) Given an APTAwith n states and index k over the alphabet×′, we can construct an APTA′ that accepts a labeled tree
over the alphabet  if some extension (or all extensions) of the labeling with labels from ′ is accepted by A. The number
of states of A′ is exponential in n · k, and its index is linear in n · k [28].
(iv) Given an APTAwith n states and index k, we can checkwhether the language ofA is empty or universal in time exponential
in n · k [15,28].
6.2. Model-checking algorithm
The complexity of themodel-checking algorithm for strategy formulas depends on the number of quantifier alternations
of a formula. We now formally define the alternation depth of a closed strategy formula. The alternation depth of a strategy
formula is defined as follows. For path formulas  , we set QA() = 0. For a strategy formula 
 we set QA(
) as follows.
– If 
 = (x, y), then QA(
) = 0.
– If 
 = 
1 ∧ 
2 or 
 = 
1 ∨ 
2 then QA(
) = max(QA(
1),QA(
2)).
– If
 = ∃x.
 or
 = ∃y.
 thenQA(
) ismax(QA(
′)+1), where
′ ranges over all universally quantified subformulas
of 
. If 
 has no universally quantified subformulas, then QA(
) = 0.
– If
 = ∀x.
or
 = ∀y.
 thenQA(
) ismax(QA(
′)+1), where
′ ranges over all existentially quantified subformulas
of 
. If 
 has no existentially quantified subformulas, then QA(
) = 0.
For example, consider the formula 
 = ∃x1. ∀y1.((∀x2.2(x2, y1)) ⇒ 1(x1, y1)). The quantifier alternation of∃x2¬2(x2, y1),1(x1, y1), and their conjunction is zero. Thequantifier alternationof∀y1.((∀x2.2(x2, y1))⇒1(x1, y1))
is one. Finally, QA(
) = 2.
Given a strategy formula 
, we construct by induction on the structure of the formula a nondeterministic parity tree
(NPT) automaton that accepts the set of strategy assignments that satisfy the formula.Without loss of generality, we assume
that the variables in X ∪ Y are not reused; that is, in a closed strategy formula, there is a one-to-one and onto relation
between the variables and the quantifiers.
Theorem 3. Given a labeled game graph G and a closed strategy formula 
 of alternation depth d, we can compute the set [
]
of states in time proportional to d-EXPTIME in the size of G, and (d + 1)-EXPTIME in the size of 
. If 
 contains only unnested
path formulas, then the complexity in the size of the formula reduces to d-EXPTIME.
Proof. The case where a closed strategy logic formula 
 is used as a state formula in a larger formula 
′, is solved by
first computing the set of states satisfying 
, adding this information to the labeled game graph G, and then computing
the set of states satisfying 
′. In addition, if d is the alternation depth of 
 then 
 is a boolean combination of closed
strategy formulas of alternation depth at most d. Thus, it suffices to handle a closed strategy formula, and reduce the
boolean reasoning to intersection, union, and complementation of the respective sets. Consider a strategy formula 
. Let
Z = {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym} be the set of variables used in 
. Consider the alphabet Sn+m and an Sn+m-labeled S-tree σ .
For a variable v ∈ X ∪ Y , we denote by σv the strategy that stands in the location of variable v and for a set Z′ ⊆ Z we denote
by σZ′ the set of strategies for the variables in Z′. We now describe how to construct an APT that accepts the set of strategy
assignments that satisfy
. We build the APT by induction on the structure of the formula. For a subformula
′ we consider
the following cases.
Case 1. 
′ = (x, y)—by Theorem 2we can construct an APTA that accepts trees all of whose paths satisfy . According
to Theorem 2, A has 2O(||) states.
Case 2. 
′ = 
1 ∧ 
2—given APTs A1 and A2 that accept the set of strategy assignments that satisfy 
1 and 
2,
respectively; we construct an APTA for the conjunction ofA1 andA2. According to Theorem 2, |A| = |A1| + |A2|
and the index of A is the maximum of the indices of A1 and A2.
Case 3. 
′ = ∃x.
1—given an APT A1 that accepts the set of strategy assignments that satisfy 
1 we do the following.
According to Theorem 2, we can construct an APTA′ that accepts a tree iff there exists a way to extend the labeling
of the tree with a labeling for the strategy for x such that the extended tree is accepted byA1. The number of states
of A′ is exponential in n · k and its index is linear in n · k. Furthermore, we have to check that the extra labeling
corresponds to a valid strategy. That is, check that the transition enabled from a given state in the tree correspond
to the transition enabled from the same state in the game. This requires multiplying the number of states of A′ by
the size of the game. The cases where 
′ = ∃y.
1, 
′ = ∀x.
1, and 
′ = ∀y.
1 are handled similarly.
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We note that for a closed strategy formula 
, the resulting automaton reads S∅-labeled S-trees. Thus, the input alphabet of
the automaton has a single input letter and it only reads the structure of the S-tree.
The above construction starts with an automaton that is exponential in the size of a given LTL formula and incurs an
additional exponent for every quantifier. In addition, the first quantificationmultiplies the number of states of the automaton
in the size of the game. Further quantifiers then incur an exponent in the size of the game aswell. In Appendix 7we specialize
these results by using nondeterministic and universal tree automata to get the exact complexity of d + 1 exponents in the
size of the formula and d exponents in the size of the game.
Consider the case where only unnested path formulas are used. Then, given a path formula(x, y), we construct an APT
A that accepts trees all of whose paths satisfy . As(x, y) does not use nesting of temporal operators, we can constructA
with a linear number of states in the size of . 1 It follows that the total complexity is d exponents in the size of the formula
and d exponents in the size of the game. Thus in the case of unnested path formulas one exponent can be removed. The
inductive construction is just like the construction for the unrestricted logic that is presented in the appendix. 
One-alternation fragment. Since ATL∗ can be expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic, it follows
that model checking simple one-alternation strategy formulas is 2EXPTIME-hard [1]. Also, since module checking can be
expressed in the one-alternation fragment, it follows that model checking one-alternation strategy formulas with unnested
path formulas is EXPTIME-hard [25]. These lower bounds together with Theorem 3 yield the following results.
Theorem 4. Given a labeled game graph G and a closed one-alternation strategy formula
, the computation of [
] is EXPTIME-
complete in the size of G, and 2EXPTIME-complete in the size of
. If
 contains only unnested path formulas, then the complexity
in the size of the formula is EXPTIME-complete.
6.3. Model checking the simple one-alternation fragment
We now present a model-checking algorithm for the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic, with better
complexity than the general algorithm. We first present a few notations.
Notation. For a labeled game graph G and a set U ⊆ S of states, we denote by G  U the restriction of the labeled game
graph to the set U, and we use the notation only when for all states u ∈ U, we have E(u) ∩ U = ∅; i.e., all states in U have a
successor in U. A path formula  is infinitary if the set of paths that satisfy  is independent of all finite prefixes. Formally,
for a path π and a finite prefix w of π , let π |w be the path obtained by removing w from π . A path formula  is infinitary
if for all paths π and all finite prefixes w of π we have π |  iff π |w |  . The classical Büchi, co-Büchi, parity, Rabin,
Streett, and Müller conditions are all infinitary conditions. Every LTL objective on a labeled game graph can be reduced to
an infinitary condition, such as a parity or Müller condition, on a modified game graph.
Lemma 1. Let G be a labeled game graph, and let 
 = (∃1, ∃2, 3) be a simple one-alternation strategy formula with
path formulas 1, 2, and 3 such that 1 and 2 are infinitary. Let W1 = [〈〈1〉〉(1)] and W2 = [〈〈2〉〉(2)]. Then [
] =[〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] in the restricted graph G  (W1 ∩ W2).
Proof.We first observe that [
] ⊆ W1 ∩ W2 as follows:
[
] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Win1(s, 1). ∃τ ∈ Win2(s, 2). π(s, σ, τ ) | 3}
⊆ {s ∈ S | Win1(s, 1) = ∅} ∩ {s ∈ S | Win2(s, 2) = ∅}
= W1 ∩ W2.
Wenowshow thatG  W1∩W2 is a gamegraph. Since1 is infinitary, for a player 1 state s ∈ S1∩W1,wehave E(s)∩W1 = ∅
and for a player 2 state s ∈ S2 ∩ W1, we have E(s) ⊆ W1. Similarly, for a player 1 state s ∈ S1 ∩ W2, we have E(s) ⊆ W2
and for a for a player 2 state s ∈ S2 ∩ W2, we have E(s) ∩ W2 = ∅. It follows that G  W1 ∩ W2 is a game graph. For any
winning strategy pair (σ, τ ) for all states s ∈ W1 ∩W2 we have π(s, σ, τ ) | (W1 ∩W2) (i.e., π(s, σ, τ ) only visits states
inW1 ∩ W2). Let U = [
] and we prove that U = [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] in G  (W1 ∩ W2) by proving inclusion in both
directions.
(i) We already showed thatU ⊆ W1∩W2.We first argue thatU ⊆ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1∧2∧3)] in G  (W1∩W2). For a state
s in U, fix a witness strategy pair (σ, τ ) such that σ ∈ Win1(s, 1), τ ∈ Win2(s, 2) and π(s, σ, τ ) | 3. We have
π(s, σ, τ ) | (W1 ∩ W2), and since σ ∈ Win1(s, 1) and τ ∈ Win2(s, 2) we have π(s, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3.
1 For a single temporal operator the number of states is constant, and boolean combinations between two automata may lead to an automaton whose size is
the product of the sizes of the two automata. The number of multiplications is at most logarithmic in the size of the formula, resulting in a linear total number
of states.
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Hence (σ, τ ) is a witness to show that
s ∈ {s1 ∈ S ∩ (W1 ∩ W2) | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s1, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3},
i.e., s ∈ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] in G  (W1 ∩ W2).
(ii) We now prove the other inclusion to complete the proof. Let s ∈ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] in G  (W1 ∩ W2). Fix
a witness strategy pair (σ1, τ1) in G  (W1 ∩ W2) such that π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3. We construct witness
strategies to show that s ∈ U as follows:
– Player 1 strategy σ ∗. Player 1 plays the strategy σ1 as long as player 2 follows τ1; if player 2 deviates at state s1, then
player 1 switches to a strategy σ̂ ∈ Win1(s1, 1). Observe that any player 2 deviation still keeps the game in W1
since for all states in s1 ∈ W1 ∩ S2 we have E(s1) ⊆ W1 and hence the construction is valid.
– Player 2 strategy τ ∗. Player 2 plays the strategy τ1 as long as player 1 follows σ1; if player 1 deviates at state s1, then
player 2 switches to a strategy τ̂ ∈ Win1(s1, 2). Observe that any player 1 deviation still keeps the game in W2
since for all states in s1 ∈ W2 ∩ S1 we have E(s1) ⊆ W2 and hence the construction is valid.
Since (a) π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧2 ∧3 (hence also π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧2), (b) the players switch to a respective
winning strategy if the other player deviates, and (c) 1 and 2 are infinitary, it follows that σ
∗ ∈ Win1(s, 1) and
τ ∗ ∈ Win2(s, 2). Moreover, we have π(s, σ1, τ1) = π(s, σ ∗, τ ∗) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3. Hence we have s ∈ U.
The desired result follows and it also follows that
[
] =
[
〈〈1, 2〉〉
(
1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3 ∧(〈〈1〉〉(1) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉(2)))] . 
Lemma 2. Let G be a labeled game graph, and let 
 = (∃1, ∃2, 3) be a simple one-alternation strategy formula with
unnested path formulas1,2, and3. Let W1 = [〈〈1〉〉(1)] andW2 = [〈〈2〉〉(2)]. Then [
] = [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧2 ∧3)] ∩
W1 ∩ W2.
Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 1 we have [
] ⊆ W1 ∩W2. Let U = [
] and we prove that U = [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧
3)] ∩ W1 ∩ W2 by proving inclusion in both directions.
(i) We already argued that U ⊆ W1 ∩ W2. We first argue that U ⊆ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] ∩ W1 ∩ W2. For a state
s in U, fix a witness strategy pair (σ, τ ) such that σ ∈ Win1(s, 1), τ ∈ Win2(s, 2) and π(s, σ, τ ) | 3. Since
σ ∈ Win1(s, 1) and τ ∈ Win2(s, 2) we have π(s, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3. Hence (σ, τ ) is a witness to show that
s ∈ {s1 ∈ S ∩ (W1 ∩ W2) | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s1, σ, τ ) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3},
i.e., s ∈ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] ∩ W1 ∩ W2.
(ii) We now prove the other inclusion to complete the proof. Let s ∈ [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3)] ∩W1 ∩W2. Fix a witness
strategy pair (σ1, τ1) in G  (W1 ∩ W2) such that π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3. We construct witness strategies to
show that s ∈ U as follows: let1 = 
11U
21 and2 = 
12U
22. The witness strategy construction follows from the
following two parts.
– Player 1 strategy σ ∗. We first observe that for all s ∈ S2 ∩ (W1 \ [
21]) we have E(s) ⊆ W1. Player 1 plays the
strategy σ1 as long as player 2 follows τ1; if player 2 deviates at state s1, then either s1 ∈ [
21] (in which case1 is
satisfied) or else player 1 switches to a strategy σ̂ ∈ Win1(s1, 1). Observe that any player 2 deviation from states
other than [
21] still keeps the game inW1, and hence the construction is valid.
– Player 2 strategy τ ∗. We again observe that for all s ∈ S1 ∩ (W2 \ [
22]) we have E(s) ⊆ W2. Player 2 plays the
strategy τ1 as long as player 1 follows σ1; if player 1 deviates at state s1, then either s1 ∈ [
22] (in which case2 is
satisfied) or else player 1 switches to a strategy τ̂ ∈ Win2(s1, 2). Observe that any player 1 deviation from states
other than [
22] still keeps the game inW2, and hence the construction is valid.
Since π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3 (hence also π(s, σ1, τ1) | 1 ∧ 2), and the players switch to a respective
winning strategy if the other player deviates, it follows that σ ∗ ∈ Win1(s, 1) and τ ∗ ∈ Win2(s, 2). Moreover, we
have π(s, σ1, τ1) = π(s, σ ∗, τ ∗) | 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3. Hence we have s ∈ U.
The desired result follows and it also follows that
[
] = [〈〈1, 2〉〉(1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3) ∧ 〈〈1〉〉(1) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉(2)]. 
Theorem 5. Let G be a labeled game graph with n states, and let 
 = (∃1, ∃2, 3) be a simple one-alternation strategy
formula.
(i) We can compute the set [
] of states in n2O(|
|) ·22O(|
|·log |
|) time; hence for formulas
 of constant length the computation
of [
] is polynomial in the size of G. The computation of [
] is 2EXPTIME-complete in the size of 
.
K. Chatterjee et al. / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 677–693 689
(ii) If 1, 2, and 3 are unnested path formulas, then there is an ATL
∗ formula 
′ with unnested path formulas such that
|
′| = O(|1| + |2| + |3|) and [
] = [
′]. Therefore [
] can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem5 follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.Wepresent details only for part (1): given1,2, and3 as parity conditions, from
Lemma 1, it follows that [(∃1, ∃2, 3)] can be computed by first solving two parity games, and then model checking a
graph with a conjunction of parity conditions (i.e., a Streett condition). An LTL formula can be converted to an equivalent
deterministic parity automaton with 22
O(||·log ||)
states and 2O(||) parities (by converting  to a nondeterministic Büchi
automaton, and then determinizing). From the conversion of an LTL formula to a deterministic parity automaton (that is an
infinitary condition) and Lemma1 it follows that expressive power of simple one-alternation fragment andATL∗ coincide. By
applying an algorithm for solving parity games [19] and a polynomial-time algorithm for model checking Streett conditions,
we obtain the desired upper bound. Observe that the model-checking complexity of the simple one-alternation fragment of
strategy logic with unnested path formulas, as well as the program complexity of the simple one-alternation fragment (i.e.,
the complexity in terms of the game graph, for formulas of bounded size), are exponentially better than the corresponding
complexities of the full one-alternation fragment.
7. Conclusions
We introduced strategy logic, a logic for reasoning about two-player games. The logic treats strategies as explicit first-
order objects. We showed that the logic is more expressive than ATL, ATL∗, and game logic. Nash equilibria and secure
equilibria can be directly expressed in the logic. We gave automata-theoretic algorithms for model checking strategy logic,
and more efficient algorithms for the one-alternation fragment of the logic. In the case of the one-alternation fragment, our
algorithms are tight.
One important direction of extending strategy logic would be to concurrent games [13] and stochastic games [11]. In
these games, winning strategies may need randomization [13], and qualitative as well as quantitative modes of winning are
of interest. In the quantitative case, given strategies for both players, the value of an LTL formulawould no longer be boolean,
but a probability value. Existential and universal quantification over strategies may then be replaced by the supremum and
infimum. Current techniques for stochastic games [5,10] may enable us to model check the one-alternation fragment of the
logic, but we have no theory of automata that would allow a simple solution to the general model-checking problem. We
note that the work of Baier et al. [3] extends ATL and ATL∗ with probabilities but lacks the explicit treatment of strategies
as in strategy logic.
Wementioned that it may be worthwhile to extend strategy logic also in the direction of partial-information games. One
would then have to introduce a hierarchy of knowledge within the logic to preserve decidability [20]. In addition, pure (i.e.,
non-randomized) strategies are no longer sufficient for partial-information games [6,7], and as for concurrent and stochastic
games, the lack of automata-theoretic methods for probabilities makes model checking difficult. If we restrict our attention
to handle pure strategies, work on handling partial-information games in the context of automata [23] may be extended to
our setting.
Finally, the algorithms presented in this article for model checking strategy logic are exponential in both the size of the
formula and the size of the game structure. We showed the tightness of the complexity bounds in the case of the one-
alternation fragment of the logic. For higher levels of the quantifier alternation hierarchy, the complexity keeps increasing,
but no matching lower bounds are known. It would be interesting to find either matching lower bounds or improve the
upper bounds. This is especially important for the complexity in terms of size of the game structure.
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Appendix A. Model checking
We specialize the automata construction presented in the proof of Theorem 3 to get the exact stated complexity bound.
We start by stating a few more known results and then incorporate them into our construction.
We start by formalizing the concept of d-EXPTIME. Let exp(0, n) = n and let exp(d + 1, n) = 2exp(d,n). We say that a
function f is d-EXPTIME in n if for some polynomial p and for every nwe have f (n) ≤ exp(d, p(n)). The following properties
of the function exp(d, n) are simple to show.
Lemma 3. For every positive d1, d2, n1, and n2, if d = max(d1, d2) and n = max(n1, n2) all the following are true.
– 2 · exp(d1, n1) ≤ exp(d1, n1 + 1).
– exp(1, n1) · exp(1, n2) = exp(1, n1 + n2) and for d > 1 we have exp(d1, n1) · exp(d2, n2) ≤ exp(d, n + 1).
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– exp(d1, n1) + exp(d2, n2) ≤ exp(d, n + 1).
– exp(1, n)! ≤ exp(2, n log n) and for d1 > 1 we have exp(d1, n1)! ≤ exp(d1 + 1, n1 + 1).
Proof.
Case 1. If d1 = 1, then 2 · exp(d1, n1) = 2 · 2n1 = 2n1+1 = exp(d1, n1 + 1). If d1 > 1, then 2 · exp(d1, n1) =
21+exp(d1−1,n1) ≤ 2exp(d1−1,n1+1) = exp(d1, n1 + 1).
Case 2.
exp(1, n1) · exp(1, n2) = 2n1+n2 = exp(1, n1 + n2)
Suppose that d > 1.
exp(d1, n1) · exp(d2, n2) ≤ exp(d, n) · exp(d, n) =
2exp(d−1,n)+exp(d−1,n) ≤ 2exp(d−1,n+1) =
exp(d, n + 1).
Case 3. Follows from Case (1) above.
Case 4.
Suppose that d1 > 1.
exp(d1, n1)! ≤ exp(d1, n1)exp(d1,n1) = 2exp(d1−1,n1)·exp(d1,n1) ≤
2exp(d1,n1+1) = exp(d1 + 1, n1 + 1).

We use the acronyms NBW for nondeterministic Büchi word automaton and NPT for nondeterministic parity tree au-
tomaton. Given an APT A = 〈, S, δ, s0, α〉 we define the dual A = 〈, S, δ, s0, α + 1〉, where δ(s, a) is obtained from
δ(s, a) by replacing ∨ by ∧ and∧ by∨ and α + 1 is the acceptance condition obtained from α by replacing Fi by Fi+1. It is
well known that A and A accept complementary languages. We use the acronym UPT for the dual of an NPT. The transition
function of an NPT can be represented as δ : S ×  → 2Sk where k is the branching degree of the tree, or equivalently
for every s ∈ S and a ∈  we have δ(s, a) = ∨i∈I ∧kj=1(j, si,j). For a UPT, the transition function is δ such that for every
s ∈ S and a ∈  we have δ(s, a) = ∧i∈I ∨kj=1(j, si,j). Notice that this is different from the usual definition of universal tree
automaton where the transition is purely conjunctive (cf. [24]).
We now state a few known results about automata and logic.
Theorem 6.
(i) Given a path formula (x, y), we can construct an NBWN with 2O(||) states that accepts all infinite words that satisfy
 [35].
(ii) Given two NPTs N1 and N2 with n1 and n2 states and indices k1 and k2, respectively, we can construct an NPT for the
disjunction of N1 and N2 with n1 + n2 states and index max(k1, k2) and an NPT for the conjunction of N1 and N2 with
n1 · n2 · (k1+k2)!k1!k2! states and index k1 + k2.
(iii) Given an NPTN over alphabet×′, we can construct an NPTN ′ that accepts a labeled tree over the alphabet if some
extension of the labeling with labels from ′ is accepted by N . The number of states of N ′ and its index are equal to those
of N .
(iv) Given an NPTN with n states and index k, we can check whether the language ofN is empty in time proportional to nO(k)
[19].
(v) Given an APT Awith n states and index k, we can construct an equivalent NPTN with 2O(nk log nk) states and index O(nk)
[28].
The following are additional facts about NPT and UPT that mostly follow from the duality of NPT and UPT.
Corollary 1.
(i) Given a path formula(x, y), we can construct an NBTN with |S| · 2O(||) states that accepts all strategy trees such that
the path described by the combination of strategies x and y satisfies  .
(ii) Given a path formula (x, y), we can construct a UPT U with |S| · 2O(||) states that accepts all strategy trees such that
the path described by the combination of strategies x and y satisfies  .
(iii) Given two UPTs U1 and U2 with n1 and n2 states and indices k1 and k2, respectively, we can construct a UPT for the
conjunction of U1 and U2 with n1 + n2 states and index max(k1, k2) and a UPT for the disjunction of U1 and U2 with
n1 · n2 · (k1+k2)!k1!k2! states and index k1 + k2.
(iv) Given a UPT U over alphabet×′, we can construct a UPT U ′ that accepts a labeled tree over alphabet if all extensions
of the labeling with labels from ′ are accepted by U ′. The number of states of U ′ and its index are equal to those of U .
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(v) Given a UPT U with n states and index k, we can check whether the language ofN is universal in time proportional to nO(k).
(vi) Given an NPTN with n states and index k, we can construct an equivalent UPT U with 2O(nk log nk) states and index O(nk).
(vii) Given a UPT U with n states and index k, we can construct an equivalent NPT N with 2O(nk log nk) states and index O(nk).
Proof.
(i) Consider the path formula  . By Theorem 6 there exists an NBW N that accepts all infinite words that satisfy  .
LetN = 〈2P,Q , δ, q0, F〉 and let S be the set of states of the game G. Consider some-labeled S-tree 〈T, ρ〉where
 = Sk for some k. For every λ ∈  denote by λx the projection of λ on the strategy x and by λy the projection of λ
on the strategy y. We construct an NBT N that reads -labeled S-trees and runs N in the directions prescribed by
the strategies x and y. Technically, we define the NBT N = 〈, (S × Q) ∪ {}, η, (s0, q0), (S × F) ∪ {}〉, where
for every (s, q) ∈ S × Q and λ ∈  the transition η is defined as follows.
η((s, q), λ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∨
q′∈δ(q,L(s))
(ρx(λ), (ρx(λ), q
′)) ∧ ∧
s′ =ρx(λ)
(s′,) if s ∈ S1∨
q′∈δ(q,L(s))
(ρy(λ), (ρy(λ), q
′)) ∧ ∧
s′ =ρx(λ)
(s′,) if s ∈ S2.
Finally, for every λ ∈  the transition η(, λ) = ∧s∈S(s,).
It is simple to see that N ′ accepts a strategy tree if the path that is the combination of x and y satisfies  .
(ii) Consider the path formula (¬)(x, y). By the construction above there exists an NBT N¬ that accepts all trees in
which the path described by the combination of strategies x and y satisfies¬ . Let U = N¬ . The UPT U accepts
a legal strategy tree if the path described by the combination of x and y does not satisfy  .
(iii) Consider the NPTs N1 = U1 and N2 = U2. By Theorem 6 there exist NPTs N∪ and N∩ for the disjunction and
conjunction of N1 and N2. The UPTs U∩ = N∪ and U∪ = N∩ are the required automata.
(iv) LetN = U . By Theorem 6 there exists an NPTN∃ that accepts a tree over alphabet if some extension of the labeling
with labels from ′ is accepted by N . It follows that U∀ = N∃ accepts a tree over alphabet  if all extensions of the
labeling with labels from ′ are accepted by U .
(v) By duality of UPT and NPT.
(vi) Consider an NPT N . It is simple to construct an APT A that complements N with same index and same number of
states. By Theorem 6 there is an NPT N ′ that accepts the same language as A. The UPT U = N ′ accepts the same
language as N .
(vii) This is dual to the construction described above for the conversion of NPT to UPT. 
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. The idea behind this tighter construction is to use NPTs and UPTs and maintain them in this form as long as possible.
Nondeterministic automata are good for existential quantification, which comes to them for free, and UPTs are good for
universal quantification, which comes to them for free. Every quantifier alternation requires to go from NPT to UPT or vice
versa incurring an exponential blow-up. As we start with an automaton whose size may be exponential in the size of a path
subformula, we get d + 1-exponentials in the size of the formula and d-exponentials in the size of the game, where d is the
number of quantifier alternations.
Consider a formula 
. As explained above, we assume that boolean combinations of formulas are handled separately
and thus assume 
 is of the form Qz.
′ for Q ∈ {∃, ∀}. If Q = ∀ we say that 
 is universal and if Q = ∃ we say that 
 is
existential. Consider
′ a strict subformula of
. We say that
′ is universal if the minimal subformula Qz.
′′ such that
′ is
a subformula of
′′ is universal, i.e.,Q = ∀. We say that
′ is existential if it is not universal. For every existential subformula
we are going to construct an NPT and for every universal subformula we are going to construct a UPT.
Recall, that the set of strategy formulas is defined as follows:

 ::= (x, y) | 
 ∧ 
 | 
 ∨ 
 | Qx.
 | Qy.
, where Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Consider a strategy formula
. Let Z = {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym} be the set of variables used in
. Consider the alphabet
Sn+m and an Sn+m-labeled S-tree σ . For a variable v ∈ X ∪ Y , we denote by σv the strategy that stands in the location of
variable v and for a set Z′ ⊆ Z we denote by σZ′ the set of strategies for the variables in Z′. We now describe how to construct
an automaton that accepts the set of strategy assignments that satisfy 
. Our automata respect the following invariants:
(i) The automaton is NPT whenever the subformula is existential.
(ii) The automaton is UPT whenever the subformula is universal.
(iii) The size of the automaton is at most d + 1-exponential in the size of the formula d-exponential in the size of the
game and its index is at most d-exponential in the size of the formula and d − 1-exponential in the size of the game,
where d is the number of quantifier alternations of the subformula.
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We build the automaton by induction on the structure of the formula. For a subformula
′ we consider the following cases.
Case 1. 
′ = (x, y)where
′ is existential—we construct an NPTN that accepts all trees in which the path prescribed by
the combination of the strategies x and y satisfies  . By Theorem 6 the automaton N has |S| · 2O(||) states and has
index 3. It follows that the invariants are satisfied.
Case 2. 
′ = (x, y) where 
′ is universal—we construct a UPT U that accepts all trees in which the path prescribed by
the combination of the strategies x and y satisfies  . By Corollary 1 the automaton U has |S| · 2O(||) states and has
index 3. It follows that the invariants are satisfied.
Case 3. 
′ = 
1∧
2 where
′ is existential—by definition
1 and
2 are also existential and hencewe have NPTsN1 and
N2 for the sets of strategy assignments that satisfy
1 and
2, respectively;we construct anNPTN for the conjunction
of N1 and N2. Let n1 and n2 denote the number of states of N1 and N2 and let k1 and k2 denote their indices. Let n
denote the number of states of N and k its index. According to Theorem 6, n = n1n2 (k1+k2)!k1!k2! and k = k1 + k2. By
Lemma 3 if for some d,mwe have n1, n2 ≤ exp(d,m) and k1, k2 ≤ exp(d− 1,m) and d > 1, then n ≤ exp(d,m+ 1)
and k ≤ exp(d,m + 1).
Case 4. 
′ = 
1 ∧ 
2 where 
′ is universal—by definition 
1 and 
2 are also universal and hence we have UPTs U1 and
U2 for the sets of strategy assignments that satisfy
1 and
2, respectively; we construct a UPT U for the conjunction
of U1 and U2. The number of states of U is the sum of the number of states of U1 and U2 and its index is the maximal
index of the two.
Case 5. 
′ = 
1∨
2 where
′ is existential—by definition
1 and
2 are also existential and hencewe have NPTsN1 and
N2 for the sets of strategy assignments that satisfy
1 and
2, respectively; we construct an NPTN for the disjunction
ofN1 andN2. The number of states ofN is the sum of the number of states ofN1 andN2 and its index is the maximal
index of the two.
Case 6. 
′ = 
1∨
2 where
′ is universal—by definition
1 and
2 are also universal and hencewe have UPTs U1 and U2
for the sets of strategy assignments that satisfy 
1 and 
2, respectively; we construct a UPT U for the disjunction of
U1 and U2. Let n1 and n2 denote the number of states of U1 and U2 and let k1 and k2 denote their indices. Let n denote
the number of states of U and k its index. According to Theorem 6, n = n1n2 (k1+k2)!k1!k2! and k = k1 + k2. By Lemma 3
if for some d,m we have n1, n2 ≤ exp(d,m) and k1, k2 ≤ exp(d − 1,m) and d > 1, then n ≤ exp(d,m + 1) and
k ≤ exp(d,m + 1).
Case 7. 
′ = ∃z.
1—by definition
1 is existential and there exists an NPTN1 that accepts the set of strategy assignments
that satisfy 
1. We construct a DPT D that checks that the strategy assigned to z is legal (i.e., the choice depicted by
the strategy is available). The automaton D is linear in S and has index 1. Let N2 denote the conjunction of N1 and D.
Its number of states is the product of the number of states of N1 and D and its index is the index of N1. According
to Theorem 2, we can construct an NPT N ′ that accepts a tree iff there exists a way to extend the labeling of the tree
with a labeling for the strategy for z such that the extended tree is accepted by N2, i.e., the strategy for z is legal and
satisfies 
1. The number of states of N ′ and its index are equal to those of N2. If 
′ is existential then N ′ is the NPT
for 
′. If 
′ is universal then according to Corollary 1 there exists a UPT U that accepts the language of N ′. Let n and
k denote the number of states of N ′, then the number of states of U is n′ = 2O(nk log nk) and its index is k′ = O(nk).
By Lemma 3 if for some d,mwe have n ≤ exp(d,m) and k ≤ exp(d− 1,m) and d > 1, then n′ ≤ exp(d+ 1,m+ 3)
and k ≤ exp(d,m + 1).
Case 8. 
′ = ∀z.
1—by definition 
1 is universal and there exists a UPT U1 that accepts the set of strategy assignments
that satisfy 
1. We construct a DPT D that checks that the strategy assigned to z is legal (i.e., the choice depicted by
the strategy is available). Let D1 denote the DPT that complements D. As before D1 is linear in S and has index 1. Let
U2 denote the disjunction of U1 andD1. Its number of states is the product of the number of states of U1 andD1 and its
index is the index of U1. According to Corollary 1, we can construct a UPT U ′ that accepts a tree iff all ways to extend
the labeling of the tree with a labeling for the strategy for z are accepted by U2, i.e., either the strategy for z is illegal or
it satisfies
1. The number of states of U ′ and its index are equal to those of U1. If
′ is universal then U ′ is the UPT for

′. If
′ is existential then according to Corollary 1 there exists an NPTN that accepts the language of U ′. Let n and k
denote the number of states of U ′, then the number of states of N is n′ = 2O(nk log nk) and its index is k′ = O(nk). By
Lemma 3 if for some d,m we have n ≤ exp(d,m) and k ≤ exp(d − 1,m) and d > 1, then n′ ≤ exp(d + 1,m + 3)
and k ≤ exp(d,m + 1).
We analyze the size of the resulting automaton. We start with automata created from path formulas that are exponential
in the length of the formula and linear in the size of the graph. Quantifier alternations incur an increase in the number of
exponents. All other operations maintain the same number of exponents. We note that in cases 3, 6, 7, and 8 we assume that
the automata are large enough in order to use Lemma 3. It follows that many conjunctions of NPTs or many disjunctions of
UPTs may cause further explosion in the number of states and index of the resulting automata. However, this is adjusted by
the relation between the length of the formula and its quantifier alternation. In order to handle cases 7 and 8 we note that
in low levels of the quantifier alternation hierarchy the polynomials in the exponent may have a large degree.
Hence we get either a UPT or an NPT that accepts the set of strategy trees that satisfy the formula. If the formula is closed,
it follows that the automaton accepts the tree without actually reading the labeling. Thus, the automaton is nonempty iff it
K. Chatterjee et al. / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 677–693 693
is universal. If the automaton is an NPT we check whether it is nonempty and if the automaton is a UPT we check whether
it is universal. If the automaton has n ≤ exp(d + 1,m) states and index k ≤ exp(d,m) then its emptiness/universality can
be decided in time exp(d + 1,m)exp(d,m) ≤ exp(d + 1,m + 1) for large enough d.
Finally, we note that for unnested path formulas, we start with an automaton of constant size instead of exponential.
Thus, the number of exponentials in the size of the formula reduces by one and the required bound follows. The theorem
follows. 
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